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The industrial control system (ICS) refers to a collection of various types of control systems 
commonly found in industrial sectors and critical infrastructures such as energy, oil and gas, 
transportation, and manufacturing. The supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
system is a type of ICS that controls and monitors operations and industrial 
processes scattered across a large geographic area. 
 
SCADA systems are relying on information and communication technology to improve the 
efficiency of operations.  This integration means that SCADA systems are targeted by the 
same threats and vulnerabilities that affect ICT assets. This means that the cybersecurity 
problem in SCADA system is exacerbated by the IT heritage issue. If the control system is 
compromised due to this connection, serious consequences may follow. This leads to the 
necessity to have an integrated framework that covers both safety and security risk analysis in 
this context. 
 
This thesis proposes an integrated risk analysis framework that comprise of four stages, and 
that build on the advances of risk science and industry standards, to improve understanding of 
SCADA system complexity, and manage risks considering process safety and cybersecurity in 
a holistic approach. 
 
The suggested framework is committed to improving safety and security risk analysis by 
examining the expected consequences through integrated risk identifications and identifying 
adequate safeguards and countermeasures to defend cyber-attack scenarios. A simplified 
SCADA system and an undesirable scenario of overpressure in the pipeline are presented in 
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1.1 Background  
 
The industrial control system ICS is a collection of numerous types of control system, 
including Process Control Systems (PCS), Distributed Control Systems (DCS), supervisory 
control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, and safety instrumented systems (SIS) 
(Knapp & Langill, 2015). ICS can be found in industrial sectors and critical infrastructures 
(Stouffer et al., 2015). 
 
The supervisor control and data acquisition (SCADA) system, which is a type of ICS system 
that controls and monitors operations and industrial processes and has become increasingly 
crucial in many application domains, such as energy, oil and gas, transportation, and 
manufacturing(Gao et al., 2014). SCADA systems spread over broad geographic locations 
(Cherdantseva et al., 2016; Gao et al., 2014). These locations require a central monitoring and 
control system for their processes (Nicholson et al., 2012). Each location comprises of field 
devices such as remote terminal units (RTUs) and programable logic controller (PLC) that are 
connected directly to sensors and actuators in the process to capture data from the process 
operation, to send control commands to the field site, and data to the supervisory systems. The 
supervisory system gathers and analyzes data from all field locations via a communication 
network and presents graphical results on Human Machine Interface (HMI) (Elhady et al., 
2019). 
 
Historically isolated SCADA systems did not prioritize security in general or cybersecurity, 
particularly in their consideration (Cherdantseva et al., 2016; Patel et al., 2005). 
Due to the increased use of ICT components and commercial off-the-shelf computers in 
industrial control systems and especially critical infrastructure industries, more operation 
technology (OT) devices are relying on the information technology IT networks to improve 
the efficiency of operations (Elhady et al., 2019). These interconnected between SCADA 
system and ICT are targeted to the same threats and vulnerabilities to ICT assets. Therefore, 
the IT heritage problem further increases cybersecurity issues in SCADA systems. Thus, 
when the control system is compromised because of this interconnection, it may result in 
severe consequences; in this case, we should consider other threats to the ICS SCADA system 
(Cherdantseva et al., 2016) 
 
According to the analysis conducted by the Kaspersky ICS CERT team indicates that the 
percentage of attacked ICS computers globally in the second half of the year 2020 increased 
by 33.4%, and the sources of the main threats in the ICS environment are the internet, 
removable media, and Email Clients (Kaspersky ICS CERT, 2021). 
 
The current state of security and safety in ICS SCADA systems is probably best illustrated by 
the following summary of several incidents that have affected ICS systems: 
 
• The Stuxnet malware in 2010 targeted the Iranian nuclear plant and damaged 1,000 
centrifuges in the process, around one-fifth of the nuclear centrifuges in the plant. Stuxnet 
is a sophisticated malware that specifically targeted industrial software and equipment that 
it self-replicated and spread throughout multiple systems such as Removable drives, Local 
area networks (LANs), and HMI database server (Hemsley & E. Fisher, 2018). 
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• A successful cyberattack on Ukraine power grid in 2015 taking control of the SCADA 
system, this attack impacted a power outage to nearly a quarter-million Ukrainians for up 
to six hours (Hemsley & E. Fisher, 2018).  
 
• Hydro was the target of a large-scale cyber-attack on March 19, 2019. The entire 
worldwide organization was impacted by the attack, with Extruded Solutions facing the 
most significant operational issues and financial losses. The entire cost is estimated to be 
between 550 and 650 MNOK. (Cyber-Attack on Hydro, 2020).   
As illustrated by the incidents mentioned above, SCADA systems are susceptible to a number 
of vulnerabilities that could compromise both safety and security in a variety of ways. All the 
above highlights that the primary concern in SCADA systems should be safety and security.  
 
Firesmith (2003) defines safety as “the degree to which accidental harm is prevented, 
reduced, and properly reacted to,” and security is “the degree to which malicious harm is 
prevented, reduced, and properly reacted to”  (Johnsen, 2012) .  
 
Therefore, it is essential to strengthening and integrates the safety and security of SCADA 
systems and develop effective integrated risk management for the safety and security of ICS 
SCADA systems to minimize the safety impacts due to potential threats. 
 
In this thesis, we suggest an approach to analyze and identify critical assets against these 
threats, as a cyber-attack in the oil and gas industry may result in a major accident.   
 
 
1.2 Problem statement, research questions and objectives   
 
There is a lack of an integrated approach to understand and manage risks in the SCADA 
system with consideration of process safety and cybersecurity from a life-cycle perspective. 
This thesis aims to propose an integrated risk analysis framework for the SCADA system 
according to risk science and industry standards. 
 
In order to meet this objective, the following will be done:  
 
• How can safety and security be integrated into a framework for analyzing risk in the 
SCADA system? 
• Technical: What are the relevant international standards, guidelines, and which shall 
or should be followed? 
• Organizational: What are the key elements of cybersecurity and functional safety 











1.3 Scope and limitations  
 
The scope of this thesis, as previously stated, is to propose an integrated risk analysis 
framework for specifically SCADA systems, emphasizing those used in the oil and gas 
industry. DCS, SIS, and other types of ICS and other sectors will not be covered will be 
excluded due to time constraints.  
 
  
1.4 Thesis structure  
 
This thesis is structured as follows. The second chapter presents a scientific literature review 
and theory. Chapter three is mainly an overview of industrial control systems and relevant 
standards. The fourth chapter outlines the key elements of the functional safety cybersecurity 
management system and the link between them. Chapter five propose a safety and security 
integrated risk analysis framework for the SCADA system. Chapter six includes a discussion, 
























2 Literature review  
 
Throughout this chapter, we will present the theoretical concepts essential for understanding 





There are many different risk definitions in risk conceptualization, so we will clarify which 
perspective is adopted in this thesis. 
 
Risk as a concept can be traced back to the seventeenth-century probability theory 
(Hacking, 1975; Smith & Brooks, 2013). Various reports and scientific literature have defined 
risk in a variety of ways; as Dake(1992)  the risk defined as “The probability of an event 
occurring, combined with an accounting for the losses and gains that the event with would 
represent if it came to pass.”  
 
Similarly, according to ISO 31000(2018) “risk is the effect of uncertainty on objectives”. 
Based on these definitions, risk can be viewed negatively (as a threat/hazard) or positively (as 
an opportunity). In contrast, the risk is defined as a “combination of the probability of 
occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm”; according to the  IEC 61511-1 (2016), the 
emphasis here is solely on negative risks. 
Aven (2015) defines risk as a consequence of activity with associated uncertainties, which is 
the definition adopted throughout this thesis. Aven (2006) argues that a wide-ranging view of 
risk is possible in this definition because it allows various assessments of the uncertainties to 
be made, in addition this approach can describe the right direction for analyzing unique 
systems; and different kind of  threats. The Society for Risk Analysis (SRA) has listed several 
definitions for the risk, but they are all consistent in their understanding of the concept (SRA, 
2018).  
As a result of this definition, the consequences C and the uncertainties U are the two primary 
risk dimensions (Aven, 2015).  
According to Aven (2015), a risk description can be written as (C', Q,' K) or as (A,' C,' Q,' K), 
which means that a specific event A' has the potential to cause inevitable consequences. With 
associated uncertainties that a particular tool Q can measure, probabilities as a tool for 
expressing uncertainty,  
P and C' are assigned based on the background knowledge K. As suggested by Aven (2015) 















As per Aven(2015), vulnerability is considered an aspect of risk, that can be defined as a 
combination of consequences and associated uncertainties that are conditional on the 
occurrence of an initiating event. Generally, can be described as (C', Q, K | A). 
 
2.2 Complexity and uncertainty   
 
The industrial control system, specifically SCADA, is considering in this thesis, which is a 
complex system that creates uncertainty when performing a risk assessment. 
 
Society of risk analysis (SRA) defined complexity as “Causal chain with many intervening 
variables and feed-back loops that do not allow the understanding or prediction of the 
system’s behavior on the basis of each component’s behavior” (SRA, 2018).  
 
The term  complexity refer to the entire portfolio of causal relationships that are highly 
sophisticated and intertwined (Aven & Renn, 2010).  
 
In theory, we can acquire accurate forecasts of the quantities of interest if we know all the 
causal factors contributing to this occurrence of an undesirable event, understand the 
mechanisms by which these elements work, and have enough evidence about relationships. 
This means similar scenarios can be created for technological malfunctions or even terrorist 
activities if we know their preferences and methods ahead of time. The inability to reestablish 
causal relationships with a high degree of confidence in the prediction and reliability is 
referred to as uncertainty. This means uncertainty is the difficulty of predicting events' 
occurrence and their consequences. Uncertainty depends on the following factors (Aven & 
Renn, 2010): 
• Inadequate database.   




A’ C’ Q K 
















• Measure of 
uncertainty. 
• Probabilities as 




• The Background 
knowledge upon 
which C’ and Q are 
built. 
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A fundamental and vital component of risk analysis is uncertainty, and it is classified into two 
forms in the context of risk analysis (Aven & Zio, 2011):  
 
• The first type is uncertainty caused by randomness, which happens owing to the intrinsic 
variability of systems.  
• The second form of uncertainty arises from a lack of knowledge and understanding of the 
phenomena or observable quantities  
Complexity and uncertainty are essential while characterize and identify  safety and security 
risk and to enhance the ability to manage surprises a resilience strategy can be used. (Johnsen, 
2012). 
 
Due to the integration of both systems, SCADA/ICT systems with process equipment. The 
systems may be destroyed by accident and making it challenging to examine data (Johnsen, 
2012). 
 
The two features that can distinguish between different classifications of risk problems are 
complexity and uncertainty degree. In this thesis, complexity refers to the highly mutual 
causal connection obvious to sophisticated causal relationships and specific effects. That often 
leads to disagreement in expert judgment about the characterization of risk. Therefore, 
scientific risk assessment can manage this complexity (Aven & Renn, 2010).  
 
 
2.3 Risk management  
 
Various sources of risk can arise in a SCADA system, and to effectively manage these risks, a 
systemic approach is needed to managing cybersecurity and safety risks in SCADA systems. 
 
Risk management encompasses all measures and activities undertaken to manage risk. It is 
concerned with all activities, situations, events, and other factors that may affect an 
organization's capacity to reach its objective (Aven,2015). The risk communication and 
management strategies might be inadequate if risk definitions lack a solid scientific base 
(Aven, 2011). Furthermore, if the organization's management is not extensively involved in 
the process. 
 
The ISO 31000:2018 Risk management standards are developed by the International 
Standards Organization (ISO). ISO 31000 (2018) is a general normative standard that applies 
to any organization, regardless of its industry, and provides a framework to manage risk to 
achieve its objectives and inform that risk management should integrated into all the activities 
of the organization. Various fields, including safety, the environment, and security, can 
















2.4 Safety vs security 
 
As stated earlier, the thesis is concerned with integrated risk analysis of SCADA system 
focusing on security risks with a safety consequence. This subchapter will offer definitions 
and extra explanations so that you can better comprehend them and distinguish between safety 
and security risks. 
 
Firesmith (2003) defines the safety is as “the degree to which accidental harm is prevented, 
reduced and properly reacted to” , that is primarily concerned with preventing damage to 
valuable assets (particularly humans) due to accidents (Johnsen, 2012). According to 
IEC61511 (2016) safety is defined as freedom from unacceptable risk.  
 
As per Firesmith(2003) security is defined as “the degree to which malicious harm is 
prevented, reduced and properly reacted to”, this is primarily concerned with preventing 
assaults on valuable assets and particularly sensitive data (Johnsen, 2012).  
 
On the other hand, IEC 62443 (2009) defines security as "prevention of illegal or unwanted 
penetration, intentional or unintentional interference with the proper and intended operation or 
inappropriate access to confidential information in IACS".  
 
Establishing context It comprises the scope of the risk management, objectives of 
the process, risk acceptance criteria. and influencing external 
and internal factors. 
Risk identification Includes positive and negative effect of outcome on 
objectives 
Risk analysis Causes and consequences analysis to provide a risk picture 
Risk evaluation Evaluating if the residual risk is acceptable by comparing risk 
analysis results to risk acceptance criteria 
Risk treatment Planning and implementing risk treatment; evaluating the 
efficiency of that treatment and determining if the residual 
risk is acceptable. 
Communication and 
consultation  
The goal of communication is to increase 
stakeholders’ awareness of the risk and cope with it while 
assessing it, whereas consultation aims to obtain feedback, 
information, and diverse points of view. 
Monitoring, review  This stage is to ensure and enhance process design, execution, 
and results in terms of quality and effectiveness. 
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Generally, the three-factor view, which covers (assets, threats, and vulnerabilities) captures 
the widespread concept of risk in the security field. According to traditional definitions, safety 
analysis is limited to accidents and unintentional risks, whereas security analysis is concerned 
with intentional sources of risk (Amundrud et al., 2017). 
 
Amundrud et al. (2017) criticized the (value, threat, and vulnerability) security risk 
perspective for failing to recognize uncertainty as a significant component of the risk 
perspective, and this perspective is entirely contradictory to current safety risk thinking.  
 
As stated by the SRA Glossary (2018) is defined (safe or secure) as being without 
unacceptable risk, and (safety or security) is interpreted in the same way (e.g., when saying 
that (safety or security) is achieved. The term “safety or security” is sometimes used as an 
antonym for “risk” (the (safety or security) level is linked to the risk level, a high (safety or 
security) level means low risk level and vice versa. Risk is a key concept in these definitions, 
as it is utilized to define safe and secure, which means the concepts of risk are considered 
applicable to both safety and security (Amundrud et al., 2017). 
 
2.5 Safety management system 
  
A safety management system (SMS) defined as a system used to manage and control safety or 
as a management system specifically designed to ensure the safety of people and property. An 
SMS is the intersection of three perspectives: safety, management, and system. The unique 
advancement of each of these three factors effects how an SMS evolves over time. SMS is 
commonly defined as the management procedures, elements, and activities designed to 
improve the organization's overall safety performance in different industries (Li & 
Guldenmund, 2018).  
 
This systematic procedure can enhance overall safety and manage risk by identify, assess, and 
control hazards to process and personnel in all operations. Figure 1 presents a generic safety 
management system based on Hale's (2005) model that can be used in a variety of industries 
and organizations  (Li & Guldenmund, 2018). 
 
The risk control system and the learning system are the two essential elements of a generic 
SMS, and each element divided into multiple sub-elements or management processes. The 
following are the sub-elements of the risk control system (Li & Guldenmund, 2018): 
 
1. The primary and subsidiary business processes describe the safety management system 
covering all life cycle phases (LCP). It is also responsible for the organization's design, 









2. The risk inventory and analysis in all LCPs are involved with identifying and assessing 
the organization's hazards and understanding how these can become visible and 
controllable. 
3. The risk barriers and controls for all LCPs and transitions, plus requirements for their 
excellent functioning, concern implementing risk barriers and controls. It describes the 
management system within its context and its proper functioning. 
4. The management system to provide all functional requirements for technical and 
procedural barriers and controls contains the so-called delivery systems, which deliver the 
safety barriers and controls to function as designated. 
The learning system includes the following sub-elements or management processes: 
 
5. Inspection and monitoring are the process that collects real-time information from the 
actual risk controls. 
6. The auditing and management review is concerned with assessing safety management and 
their performance to make continuous improvement possible. 
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7. The incident and accident registration and analysis are the end and start box in an SMS. 
This process aims to identify hazards and provide critical information for the management 
of safety in the organization. 
 
2.6 Threat vs Hazard 
The threat is defined as “any indication and circumstances, with potential to cause the loss of 
or damage to the assets”. It also necessitates a thorough understanding of the adversaries' 
intentions and motives and their ability to jeopardize the assets concerned.  (Roper, 1999; 
Smith & Brooks, 2013).While NIST SP 800-53 defined threat as “Any circumstance or event 
with the potential to adversely impact agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or 
reputation), agency assets, or individuals through an information system via unauthorized access, 
destruction, disclosure, modification of information, and/or denial of service”. Whereas hazard is 
defined according to IEC 61511-1(2016) as the event that cause harm. Similarly Rausand (2013) 
defined hazard as “a	source	of	danger	that	may	cause	harm	to	an	asset”. Both hazard and 
threats can cause the same impact on the assets and compromise the safety as shown in the 
Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2 hazard vs threat (Zalewski et al., 2016) 
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2.7 New context of risk of SCADA systems in the digital world 
 
Historically, before the improvement of data acquisition and control systems, components of 
SCADA systems were air gabbed and operated on isolation(Gao et al., 2014), and this 
isolation made them less exposed to cyber threats. It can be considered a secure and complex 
system at the same time because it was challenging to collect data and control remote 
operations. However, integrating SCADA systems with the ICT opens the possibility of 
cybersecurity and safety risks. Security and safety considerations for SCADA systems are 
getting more attention as security incidents increased on critical infrastructures(Pliatsios et al., 
2020). 
 
Several older legacy ICS systems are not compliant with modern security technologies such 
as enhanced encryption and intrusion detection devices, which is a significant difficulty with 
ICS security (Warren & Leitch, 2015). 
 
SCADA systems are available in critical infrastructures, therefore used in production plants 
and distribution systems such as oil and gas industry. Which made SCADA systems are 
attracted for threat actors(Obodoeze et al., 2018).  
 
SCADA systems are prone to different sorts of cyber threats, including insider attacks by a 
human or malicious software that takes control of the system to cause risk to the system, and 
people safety (Gao et al., 2014). For example, the human-machine interfaces (HMI) of a 
SCADA system are a common gateway for malware, Since the intention of threat actors is 
usually the to get access to the control system and cause a significant damage. 
 
ICS systems have traditionally been closed, stand-alone systems; however, they are now 
interconnected in corporate networks and connected to the internet to enable remote access 
and monitoring.  However, these new technological advancements bring with them unknown 























3 Overview of industrial control system (ICS) 
3.1 Industrial control system definition  
 
The Stouffer et al. (2015) defines ICS as “a general term that encompasses several types of 
control systems, including supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) systems, 
distributed control systems (DCS), and other control system configurations such as 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLC) often found in the industrial sectors and critical 
infrastructures.”  
 
ICS is a collection of numerous control system, including Process Control Systems (PCS), 
Distribution Control Systems (DCS), supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, and safety instrumented systems (SIS)(Knapp & Langill, 2015). These systems 
control and monitor local and remote processes with fully or partially automated control in 
manufacturing and industrial facilities. 
 
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) are used for various social infrastructure facilities and play 
an essential role in performing their control functions and ensuring their safety. ICS currently 
uses an open architecture and is often connected to external systems, such as office 
systems(Kondo et al., 2018).  
 
3.2 Comparison between (ICS) and information technology (IT) 
 
Confidentiality, integrity, and availability, also known as the CIA triad, is a model for security 
policy formulation in the information security area and each feature reflects a primary data 
security goal in order to achieve the following (Bonandir et al., 2021; Dardick, 2010):  
 
• Integrity: it is necessary to provide protection against illegal information tampering or 
loss, which necessitates a declaration of non-repudiation, accuracy, and authenticity. 
• Confidentiality: to preserve data privacy and classified information, maintain authorized 
access and limit transparency. 
• Availability: to make sure that information is accessible and used in a timely and accurate 
manner. 
 
The availability and integrity of the ICS security triad are more critical than confidentiality in 
terms of overall effectiveness(Tariq et al., 2019). The goal of the ICS system is to maximize 
availability so that systems can continue to operate and perform without being interrupted.  
 
Data integrity is critical in control systems; if the operator's screen in the control room does 
not accurately reflect the current situation, there could be a significant problem.  
This is will significantly impact security and operations. Since the data in an ICS context, 
such as temperature, vibration, and speed, is only transient (Bonandir et al., 2021). 
 
ICS systems are concerned with the continued availability of the connected industry process, 
such as power generation or water treatment, a security distinction between ICS systems and 
information technology systems. IT systems, on the other hand, are concerned with preventing 






Stouffer et al.(2015) outlines in Table 3 some of the most common differences between 
information technology systems and industrial control systems. 
 
Table 3 IT vs ICS (Stouffer et al., 2015)  
Category IT ICS 
Performance Requirements  
 
Non-real time 
Response must be consistent 
High throughput is demanded 
High delay may be acceptable 
Less critical emergency interaction 
Tightly restricted access control 
can be implemented to the degree 
necessary for security. 
 
Real-time  
Response is time-critical  
Modest throughput is acceptable  
High delay and/or jitter is not 
acceptable  
Response to human and another 
emergency interaction is critical  
Access to ICS should be strictly 
controlled but should not hamper 





Acceptable responses such as 
rebooting.   
 
Availability deficiencies can often 
be tolerated, depending on the 
system’s operational requirements  
 
Responses such as rebooting may 
not be acceptable because of 
process availability requirements. 
  
Availability requirements may 
necessitate redundant systems  
Outages must be planned and 
scheduled days/weeks in advance  
High availability requires 
exhaustive pre- deployment testing  
 
Risk Management Requirements  
 
Manage data  
Data confidentiality and integrity 
is paramount  
Fault tolerance is less important – 
momentary downtime is not a 
major risk  
Major risk impact is delay of 
business operations  
 
Control physical world  
Human safety is paramount, 
followed by protection of the 
process  
Fault tolerance is essential, even 
momentary downtime may not be 
acceptable  
Major risk impacts are regulatory 
non- compliance, environmental 







Primarily wired networks with 
some localized wireless 
capabilities  
Typical IT networking practices  
 
Many proprietary and standard 
communication protocols  
Several types of communications 
media used to include dedicated 
wire and wireless (radio and 
satellite)  
Networks are complex and 
sometimes require the expertise of 
control engineers  
 
Component Lifetime  
 
3 to 5 years  
 
 10 to 15 years  
 
Components Location  
 
Components are usually local and 
easy to access  
 
Components can be isolated, 
remote, and require extensive 






3.3 SCADA system architecture  
 
SCADA architecture has evolved gradually over the course of four generations of SCADA 
systems, from monolithic to distributed, interconnected, and internet of things technology. 
The first generation: monolithic SCADA systems with remote terminal units work in isolation 
environments, with no relation to other systems. The second generation was introduced, in 
which RTUs were connected to communication servers via a wide area network (WAN). Due 
to the entry of new equipment vendors into the market, industrial expansion, and an increase 
in the number of automated processes, it became necessary to implement the next generation 
of SCADA systems, also known as networked SCADA systems or third generation SCADA 
systems. The Internet of Things (IoT) and the cloud are fundamental in the fourth generation. 
With the Internet of Things (IoT), different devices or sensors can collect data from remote 
locations and communicate with their respective SCADA masters via wireless LANs; the data 
collected is then sent to the cloud for further processing. In addition to being simple to 
maintain and integrate, these systems also offer faster data availability, scalability, efficiency, 
and cost reduction (Tariq et al., 2019). 
 
The components of a SCADA system can be divided into two main categories: field sites and 
control centers. More than one field site spread across a large geographical area, remote 
terminal units (RTUs) are examples of field-side components that are connected to physical 
processes such as motors, valves, thermostats, and other instruments. The control center 
collects information about the status of field devices and the physical processes occurring in 
its area of responsibility. The  Control Center, which consists of the HMI (Human Machine 
Interface), the Historian, and the MTU (Master Terminal Unit), receives real-time data 
regarding the status of PLCs and RTUs through the use of a data acquisition system (Eden et 
al., 2015). 
 
Generally, a SCADA system architecture as shown in Figure 3 includes the following 
components (Eden et al., 2015; Gao et al., 2014):  
 
 




• Master terminal unit (MTU) 
 
Serves as the primary monitoring station, it is in charge of controlling and commanding the 
remote terminal unit (RTU). It also responds to messages from the RTU/ processes and stores 
them to facilitate future communication with the device (Yadav & Paul, 2021). 
 
• Human machine Interface (HMI) 
The human-machine interface (HMI) serves as a communication link between SCADA 
hardware and software components. SCADA operational information, such as controlling, 
monitoring, and communication between several RTUs and MTUs in the form of text, 
statistics, or other comprehensible content, is in charge of this component of the SCADA 
system (Yadav & Paul, 2021). 
 
• Remote terminal units (RTUs) 
The RTU is a microprocessor controlled electronic device that are used to interface the signals 
of physical objects (sensors) in the system to digital data. In addition, these units are used to 
transmit real-time data toward the supervisory system and, receive the commands from the 
master terminal unit for controlling the connected objects. Although, it is very similar to a 
PLC and performs almost the same function However, RTUs have faster CPUs and much 
more extensive communication support. They also tend to be more reliable in harsh 
environments(Eden et al., 2015). 
 
• Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) 
Computerized devices used to control process such as sensory devices Supervisory systems 
(Eden et al., 2015). 
 
• IED (Intelligent Electronic Device): 
The IED enables monitoring and controlling the operational process and power protection and 
is entirely independent of other devices to perform high-level communication (Eden et al., 
2015). 
 
• Communications infrastructure  
It is responsible for facilitating communication between various components of the SCADA 
network framework. Wireless or wired connections can be made depending on the situation. 
Wireless media is widely used today because it allows people in geologically dispersed areas 
to communicate with people in less accessible regions without wires(Yadav & Paul, 2021). 
 
3.4 Purdue model of SCADA system 
 
The Purdue model shows typical architecture of ICS SCADA system the interconnections and 
interdependencies of all the main components of the system (What Is the Purdue Model for 
ICS Security, n.d.): 
 
• Level 0-Physical process: Represents the actual physical processes. 
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• Level 1 -Intelligent devices: Process sensors, analyzers, actuators, and other associated 
instruments are used to detect and manipulate physical processes. 
 
• Level 2-Control systems: SCADA software is used to manage, monitor, and control 
physical processes. The distributed control system (DCS) and programmable logic 
controllers (PLCs) are generally implemented within the facility. However, SCADA can 
manage systems over great distances from the actual location of the facilities. The human-
machine interface provides basic controls, and monitoring (HMI) coupled to DCS and 
PLCs, whereas SCADA systems aggregate data and transfer it upstream for historian 
recording at level 3. 
 
• Level 3 - operations systems: This is where the manufacturing floor's production 
workflow is managed. Batch management, data recording, operations, and plant 
performance are handled by customized systems based on operating systems like 
Windows.  This layer also includes databases or historians for storing data from 
operations. Any disturbances at this level can affect the entire manufacturing facility and 
can result in hours or days of downtime, including a massive potential for revenue loss. 
 
• Level 3.5 - Demilitarized zone (DMZ): This level contains security systems like firewalls 
and proxies used to divide or air gap the IT and OT systems.   At this point, the IT 
"converge" with OT systems, increasing the security risks for OT systems.  The rising 
demand for bidirectional data flows between OT and IT systems have resulted from 
automation, which has resulted in improved efficiencies. For businesses accelerating their 
digital transformation. 
 
• Level 4/5 – Enterprise: This is often where the core business functions occur on the IT 
network as we know it today. It supervises business operations and gives business 
direction. Plant production plans, material usage, shipping, and inventory levels are 
controlled by enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems.  Every disturbance at this level 
might cause days or even weeks of downtime, resulting in severe revenue loss due to 
delayed or stopped downstream processes. 
 
3.5 Description of standards, regulation, and best practices for ICS safety 
and security 
 
Here is a brief overview of commonly used ICS SCADA safety and security related technical 
standards, best practices that are relevant for this work and categorized in the following areas: 
 
3.5.1 NIST 800-82 guideline 
 
In May 2015, the "Computer Security Division" published a guideline relevant to this thesis. 
The "Special Publication 800-82 (Final Public Draft), Guide to Industrial Control Systems 
(ICS) Security". It provides an overview of cybersecurity strategy for ICS and SCADA 
systems. The NIST SP 800-82 describes common ICS architectures, and listed the system's 
critical threats and vulnerabilities. A security countermeasure to reduce the risk associated 
with ICS vulnerabilities and threats are suggested(Stouffer et al., 2015). 
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3.5.2 IEC 62443 
 
The Industrial Automation and Control System (IACS) Security Committee of the ISA 
developed ISA standards and technical reports. The IEC 62443 family of standards establishes 
the overall framework for securing IACS and addressing the essential cybersecurity 
management aspects throughout the lifecycle. The main objective of these standards is to 
establish the objectives and maturity level of cybersecurity toward its automation system. 
And can be used by  an asset owner, system operators, integrators(IEC 62443, 2009).  
 
 
3.5.3 DNVGL- RP-l08 cyber security in the oil and gas industry based on IEC62443 
 
Recommended practices report by DNV GL, Cybersecurity in the oil and gas industry based 
on IEC 62443, covers how to implement the standard and the control systems that are 
frequently used by organizations that operate in critical infrastructures, such as petroleum 
production and distribution facilities. This recommended practice clarifies the roles and duties 
of the respective parties (asset owner, system integrator, product supplier, service provider, 
compliance authority), as well as who performs the tasks, who should be involved, and what 
is anticipated in terms of inputs and outputs from each party (DNVGL-RP-G108, n.d.). 
 
3.5.4 Norwegian Oil and Gas 104  
 
The Norwegian Oil and Gas Association NOROG 104 (2016) developed a recommended 
guidelines on information security baseline requirements for process control, safety, and 
support of ICT systems. Furthermore, to improve the safety and consistency of Norwegian 
Continental Shelf (NCS) operations and increase the focus on information security in the 
offshore industry. The guideline contains several obligatory Information Security Baseline 
Requirements (ISBRs). For each ISBR, a control and an objective are defined, and then 
implementation guidance is structured following the phases of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework, as shown in Figure 4. 
 
 
Figure 4 functions of information security (NOROG 104, 2016) 
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3.5.5 IEC 61511 
 
The IEC 61511(2016) standard specifies the application of safety instrumented systems 
(SISs)in the process industries, and it covers the requirement for specification, design, 
installation, operation, and maintenance of safety instrumented systems in the process 
industry entire lifecycle, to reach or maintain a safe process. It suggests a risk-based approach 
for evaluating the safety instrumented functions (SIFs) performance levels by assigning a 
safety integrity level (SIL).   
This standard focus on the lifecycle requirements for system architecture hardware 
configuration, application programming, and system integration to achieve functional safety, 
Specifications for attaining functional safety are provided; however, there is no indication of 
who is accountable for putting the requirements into action (e.g., designers, suppliers, 
owner/operating business, contractor). Safety planning, project planning and management, 
and national legislation will all play a role in allocating this duty to the appropriate parties. 
In the 2016 version, IEC 61511 included two clauses to address SIS security: 
• 8.2.4: A security risk assessment shall be carried out to identify the security vulnerabilities 
of the SIS. 
• 11.2.12: The design of the SIS shall be such that it provides the necessary resilience 

























4 Lifecycle of functional safety and cybersecurity management 
systems.  
 
4.1 Description of the key elements of functional safety lifecycle  
 
Safety lifecycle is defined by IEC 61508 as the ‘Necessary activities involved in the 
implementation of safety-related systems, occurring during a period of time that starts at the 
concept phase of a project and finishes when all of the E/E/PE safety-related systems, other 
technology safety- related systems and external risk reduction facilities are no longer 
available for use.’ Management of functional safety encompasses all activities needed to 
guarantee safety integrity level requirements are identified, designed, and maintained 
throughout the whole lifecycle of the systems (IEC 61511-1:2016, n.d.; NOG 070, n.d.). The 
key elements of IEC 61511 functional safety lifecycle are divided in three phases as shown in 
Figure 5 are(Hildenbrandt & van Beurden, 2019): 
 
• Assessment phase. 
• Develop & implement phase. 






Figure 5  Functional safety lifecycle (Hildenbrandt & van Beurden, 2019) 
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The Overall functional safety lifecycle comprises all the activities needed to reach the 
requirements and the relating objectives of the different lifecycle phases according to  




Table 4 overview of functional safety lifecycle (IEC 61511, 2016) 
Safety Lifecycle Objectives 
1. Hazard and risk 
analysis 
Define hazards and potential hazardous events, their 
consequences. Perform a risk analysis to determine the 
event sequences leading to each event, the requirements 
for risk reduction, and the safety functions needed to 
meet the required risk reduction. 
2. Allocation of safety 
function 
The allocation of safety functions to protective layers 
and the determination of the related safety integrity level 




The Safety Requirements Specification (SRS) for each 
safety-instrumented system must be defined. The SRS is 
created by allocating SIFs and identifying requirements 
throughout the safety planning process to obtain the 
required functional safety(NOG 070, n.d.). 
4. SIS design and 
engineering 
 
To design the SIS to satisfy the requirements for SIF 




It is necessary to integrate and test the SIS to ensure that 
the SIS satisfies all safety criteria, including the needed 
SIF and related safety integrity. 
6. Operation and 
maintenance 
 
Assuring that the functional safety of the SIS is 
maintained throughout its operation and maintenance 
 
7. Modification Ensure that the requisite SIL is acquired and maintained; 
adjustments and improvements must be made to the SIS. 















4.2 Description of the key elements of cybersecurity management lifecycle  
 
IEC 62443 (2009) defines Cybersecurity as "actions required to preclude unauthorized use of, 
denial of service to, modification to, disclosure of, loss of revenue form, or destruction of 
critical systems or information assets". Figure 6 shows the key elements of cyber Security 
lifecycle defined by IEC 62443 (2009) and there are divided in three phases (Hildenbrandt & 
van Beurden, 2019): 
 
• Assessment Phase  
This phase including the scope of the system, a high level of cybersecurity risk assessment to 
define the initial security target level, and a detailed cybersecurity risk assessment to 
determine the security level for each zone and conduit. 
 
• Implement Phase 
In this phase, cybersecurity countermeasures are applied, and a validation of security level is 
conducted to demonstrate that countermeasures are in place and that risk acceptance 
requirements are met.  
 
• Maintain Phase 
This phase ensures that the security considerations are maintained and that the procedures to 
maintain that level are accomplished and that no modifications will impact the system during 
the modification process. 
 
 
Figure 6 Cybersecurity lifecycle (Hildenbrandt & van Beurden, 2019) 
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The overall cybersecurity lifecycle, which includes all steps required to meet the criteria and 
corresponding objectives of the several lifecycle phases, as defined by IEC 62433(2009) are 
presented in the Table 5: 
 
Table 5 cybersecurity lifecycle 
Cyber security lifecycle Objectives 
1. Specification 
 
The System under consideration (SUC) is identified, an 
initial high level of cybersecurity risk assessment is 
performed, and the system is divided into security zones 
and conduits, among other activities. Ultimately, the 
Target Security Levels for each Zone and Conduit in the 




This phase of the lifecycle involves a detailed 
cybersecurity risk assessment for each zone and conduit 
and a comprehensive design of the (SUC), including 
technical security measures based on the Security Level 
security for each zone and conduit. 
3. Implementation 
 
The organizational security measures needed for the 
operations and maintenance phases are created in this 
phase to be used during the verification and validation 
phase and develop organizational security measures for 
the maintenance phase and operations phase. 
4. Verification & 
Validation 
 
Ensure that the technological and organizational security 
measures fulfill the security criteria defined in the 
cybersecurity requirements specification. 
5. Operation 
 
Regularly evaluate and update the ICS risk assessment, 
organizational and technological security measures and 
perform operational security measures, such as incident 




Implement management of change processes, including 
evaluating risk assessments and update organizational 
and technical security measures. Perform organizational 
security measures for maintenance and monitor threats 
and security vulnerabilities. 
7. Decommissioning 
 
The decommissioning process must be carried out in a 
manner that does not jeopardize the asset owner's 
ongoing activities. The deletion or purging of sensitive 








4.3 Description of the key element of ICS cybersecurity management 
system (CSMS) 
 
When it comes to protecting ICS from cyber-attacks, these elements reflect what must be 
included in the CSMS. Generally, the key elements as shown in the Figure 7 are divided into 





Figure 7 key elements of ICS cybersecurity management system (IEC 62443, 2009) 
 
 
4.3.1 Risk analysis 
 
The CSMS's first key element is risk analysis, and it is split into two parts that fall within this 
category: 
 
• Business rationale.  
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ICS cyber incidents can have severe financial, health, safety, environmental, and other 
consequences. A business rationale is based on the type and scale of these potential 
consequences. The primary goal is to identify and record each organization's specific 
requirements to mitigate cyber risk for ICS. Along with ensuring that senior management 
continues to support an appropriate level of investment in the ICS cybersecurity program. 
 
• Risk identification, classification, and assessment. 
 
Organizations protect their operation capabilities by systematically identifying, prioritizing, 
and assessing possible security risks using acceptance criteria. The main goal is to identify the 
set of ICS cyber risks that the business confronts and estimate the likelihood and severity of 
these risks.  
 
4.3.2 Addressing risk with the CSMS 
 
The CSMS's second key element is addressing risk with the CSMS, and it represents the 
objectives and information in the CSMS. It is split into three parts: 
• Security policy, organization, and awareness. 
• Selected security countermeasures. 
• Implementation. 
 
4.3.3 Monitoring and improving the CSMS 
 
Monitoring and improving the CSMS is the third key element of the CSMS. It comprises both 
verifying that the CSMS is being used and assessing the efficacy of the CSMS itself. It is split 
into two parts: 
 
• Conformance. 
• Review, improve and maintain the CSMS. 
 
4.4 Integrated Functional Safety and Cybersecurity Management 
Lifecycles  
 
Only being aware of process risks is no longer sufficient for plant operators, engineers, 
design, and support employees. Risks from cyber-attacks not only have a financial impact on 
a company's operations, but they can also result in process safety events being initiated 
(Hildenbrandt & van Beurden, 2019). For that reason, in this subchapter, we review the link 
between the functional safety and cybersecurity lifecycles and how they are related. 
 
The functional safety and cybersecurity lifecycle have a comparable structure as shown in the 
Figure 8, consisting of risk assessment or analysis of the system, followed by the design and 
implementation, finally operation and maintenance safeguards or countermeasures to protect 








Figure 8 The link between functional safety and cybersecurity Lifecycle (Walkington & Sugavanam, 2019) 
 
The table 6 illustrates the distinction between cybersecurity and functional safety in terms of 




Table 6  Functional safety lifecycle vs cybersecurity lifecycle (ISA-TR84.00.09, 2017) 
 
 
As per (Walkington & Sugavanam, 2019) the similarities between functional safety and the 
cybersecurity lifecycle are: 
 
• Performance based standards. 
• The same need to achieve a safety culture. 
• Supporting systematic capability and processes. 
• Competency management is required. 
• Require adequate maintenance, regular auditing, and assessment.  
• They can cause a potentially dangerous event. 
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According to Hildenbrandt & van Beurden (2019) these similarities give opportunity to 
combine both lifecycles to build a single integrated lifecycle that covers functional safety, 
cybersecurity that can enhance the awareness of all potential hazards, mitigation measures, 
and response plans due to communication and cooperation among engineering, operation 







































5 Overview of the proposed integrated framework 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The integrated framework can be seen as a variant of process hazard analysis with a 
consideration of cybersecurity assessment that is based on scientific grounds and standards 
compliance. Its purpose is to examine the SCADA systems security risk with safety impacts, 
as shown in Figure 9, to provide a comprehensive analysis and holistic approach to ensure all 
assets within the scope of the study. This can allow decision-makers to view the risk from 
several perspectives. Moreover, the framework is a straightforward process, although it is 
challenging to implement due to the system's complexity precisely, understanding the 
interdependencies between various assets, and the necessity for diverse experts to participate 









This framework is built mainly on the structure of ISO 31000 (2018) standards, Risk 
management, and the scientific article "A unified framework for risk and vulnerability 
analysis covering both safety and security" (Aven, 2006). It is the process that includes 
understanding and analyzing the system, finding, and describing the risk. The flowchart 
shown in Figure 10 illustrates the proposed integrated framework (Hybrid assets classification 































Figure 10  Flow chart of hybrid assets classification and integrated risk analysis 
 
1.Identify the Context and the functional requirement of SCADA system 
2.Identifiy and analyze all assets in the SCADA Purdue model 
4.3 Strength of knowledge assessment 
4.2 Perform consequence analysis with associated uncertainties 
4.1 Identify undesirable events caused by threat/Hazards 
3.3. List all critical assets 
3.Scan the vulnerability and criticality of the assets 
 
3.1. Vulnerable 
to cyber attack 








4.4 Describe Risk  




The first stage of the integrated framework, "Identify the context and the functional 
requirement of the SCADA system," is the outcome of combining two steps, Establish the 
context 31000 (2018) and identify the relevant functions and subfunctions to be analyzed and 
relevant performance measures (observable quantities) into a single step.  
 
Whereas the second stage, Identify and analyze all assets in the SCADA Purdue model, is 
similar to the concept of "asset management" from ISO 27001 (2017), and "assets" (IEC 
62443, 2009).  
 
The third stage scan the vulnerability and check the criticality of asset features in each level in 
the SCADA Purdue models is requirement from NIST800-82(2015) to understand the 
complexity and interdependency of the system.  
 
The steps of the fourth stage are adopted from several standards and frameworks; The 
following steps are the same as in Aven (2006), identify relevant sources of risk (threats, 
hazards) and perform an uncertainty analysis of these sources Perform a consequence 
analysis, with associated uncertainties and describe risks, which is similar to risk 
identification and risk analysis steps in (ISO 31000, 2018). Adversary analysis tactics and 
techniques based on real-world observations developed by (MITRE ATT&CK®, n.d.). The 
strength of knowledge assessment is the same as the framework proposed by Flage & Aven 
(2009) for assessing the strength of background knowledge in risk assessments. We provide 
Table 7 summarize what is the stages of integrated framework and related reference. 
 
Table 7 Summarize the stages of the framework 
Stages of the framework  References 
1. Identify the context and the functional requirement of 
the SCADA system. 
(ISO 31000, 2018) 
(Aven, 2006) 
(IEC 62443, 2009) 
(Cherdantseva et al., 2016) 
2. Identify and analyze all assets in the SCADA Purdue 
model 
(ISO 27001, 2017)  
(IEC 62443, 2009) 
 
3. Check the criticality of asset features in each level in 
the SCADA Purdue 
(NIST800-82,2015) 
4. Integrated risk analysis 
 
(Aven, 2006) 
(ISO 31000, 2018) 
(MITRE ATT&CK®, n.d.). 
(Flage & Aven, 2009) 






5.2 Stage 1: Identify the context and the functional requirement of 
SCADA system. 
 
In ISO31000 (2018) establishing the context is one of the main stages of a risk management 
process, and in NORSOK Standard Z-013(2010), it is a part of the risk assessment process. 
This stage aims to identify and facilitate the scope and objective of the whole process, 
especially for a support decision (Cherdantseva et al., 2016). Moreover, to assess the risk to 
(people, environment, assets) from a cyber-attack perspective on process Safety systems. 
 
This stage should include the following:  
 
• The objective and the scope of the assessment (ISO 31000, 2018) 
 
• Deep knowledge and good understanding of SCADA system architecture its 
interdependencies with other systems, such as interactions between the safety requirement 
and information security, the goal of stakeholders, roles, and responsibilities, in addition 
to the interactions between human and machine. Understands the degree of integration 
between SCADA system and safety system), and all related information to identify the 
related risk to a system and perform a risk assessment (Cherdantseva et al., 2016; IEC 
62443, 2009). 
 
• Studying several aspects such as the structure of the organization, the culture state of 
safety and cybersecurity, specific goals, and strategies and investigates possible internal 
and external influences (ISO 31000, 2018). 
 
• Risk acceptance criteria should be documented, especially regarding potential cyber-
attacks and process safety, in addition to responsibilities, available resources, time, tools, 
methods, and associated constraints (ISO 31000, 2018). 
 
Without establishing the context, it may not properly identify the risks related to the system, 
which are the basis for well-informed risk management (Cherdantseva et al., 2016).  
 
5.2.1 Application of stage 1 on simplified SCADA system. 
 
• The objective and the scope of the assessment 
The Objective and the scope of the assessment is to assess risk to personnel (Safety impact) 
from cyber-attack. This stage covers the strategies and methods needed for the assessment and 
decision-making process. HAZOP for hazard and threat identification. In causes analysis, the 
fault tree can be used, and in the analysis of the consequences, the event tree can be used. 
 
• Deep knowledge and good understanding of SCADA system architecture 
In chapter 3 we illustrated in detail the SCADA system architecture and main components.  
 
• The structure of the organization, the culture state of safety and cybersecurity 
The proposed simplified model SCADA system, as shown in Figure 11, is one of ICS in the 
oil and gas industry that can perform several functions; for example, The operator or the 
engineer can monitor and control the pipeline system, perform maintenance, and shut down a 
valve. All these actions can be done remotely at the control room via human-machine 





Figure 11 Simplified model for SCADA system 
 
• Risk acceptance criteria 
The relevant risk acceptance criteria should be in line with risk acceptance criteria established 
with the organization.  
 
Throughout the analysis, we assume the following assumptions: 
• PLC and SCADA system monitors and controls pressure and flow rate measurements in 
pipeline. 
• Through the SCADA communication protocols, adversaries can infiltrate the system and 

















5.3 Stage 2: Identify and analyze all assets in the SCADA Purdue model 
The classification analysis outlined in this stage provides a comprehensive basis for collecting 
information about the assets of the SCADA Purdue model as shown in the Figure 12. During 
this stage, the technical equipment of the SCADA system is not the only assets that is 
addressed (Cherdantseva et al.,2015).  
 
 
Figure 12 Purdue model of Scada system (What Is the Purdue Model for ICS Security, n.d.) 
 
 
A security program's primary focus is to keep assets protected; it is necessary to compile an 
inventory of the assets that must be safeguarded to gain a comprehensive understanding of the 
risk to an ICS environment; Assets can be divided into three categories (IEC 62443, 2009):  
• Physical Assets: Any physical component or combination of components that belong to an 
organization is considered a physical asset, such as Control systems, physical network 
components, and transmission media. The most valuable physical assets comprised the 
equipment controlled by the automation system. 
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• Logical Assets: Informational assets such as intellectual property, algorithms, proprietary 
practices, process-specific knowledge, public reputation, and other elements that reflect an 
organization's ability to operate or innovate can be included. Process assets include the 
automation logic that is used to carry out the industrial process.  It may be compromised 
through physical (e.g., media destruction) or nonphysical (e.g., unauthorized modification) 
ways, resulting in a loss of process integrity or availability.  
 
• Human Assets: People, the knowledge, and skills they hold linked to their production 
activities, certificates, expertise are considered human assets. Processing facilities are 
rarely fully automated. Thus, any disruption to the operations staff could significantly 
impact production, even if the physical and logical systems are unaffected. Every accident 
or attack that results in a person's injury would be considered an impact on human assets. 
 
The classification analysis outlined in this stage presents a general basis for collecting 
information about the assets of the SCADA system, as shown in the Figure 13: 
 






















5.3.1 Application of stage 2 on simplified SCADA system. 
In this system, the asset (PLC) can be analyzed accordance to several classification for 
example as shown in the Figure 14: 
• Location of PLC in the Purdue model is in the basic control level/ level 1, the physical 
asset is in the control room.  
• The way of communication with other assets, which depend on the attributes and 
location (physical, logical) of other assets that communicated with. 
• The PLC's function is to remotely monitor a system's pressure state and execute the 
appropriate actions connected to the controlled process. 
 
 




• Interdependency means when two assets are interdependent; there is a bidirectional  
relationship between them in which the operations of asset A have an influence the 
functioning of Asset B and the processes of Asset B have an influence the functioning 
of Asset A. Whereas the dependency is a one-way relationship that exists between two 
assets as illustrated in the Figure 15 (Petit et al., 2015). 
 
PLC                SCADA system (Level 2) interdependent 
PLC          Sensor (Level 0) are dependent.  


























authorization no encryption 
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Figure 15 The difference between Dependency and Interdependency (Petit et al., 2015) 
 
 
• Secure by design, we determine whether the asset was designed with security features 
and capabilities such as encryption solutions or authentication. In this system, if the 
adversary has logical access to the PLC, they can write commands and change the 
process without authenticating themselves. 
 
5.4 Stage 3:  Scan the vulnerability and criticality of the assets. 
 
This stage illustrates the interdependencies and complexity between different asset types by 
examining the relationship between assets that might be vulnerable to cyber-attack and the 
assets that perform a safety function to assist organizations in prioritizing their most assets in 
the safety system domain. Moreover, it can help to identify threats as soon as they are 
identified. 
 
Critical assets are defined in this framework as the asset that can directly or indirectly affect 
the availability of operation and process safety function.  
o This asset can perform a safety or process function and connect to vulnerable asset. 
o This asset would be a risk entry point or placing future potential resources at risk. This 
means a compromised or failure of connected assets can cause a catastrophic event. 
These assets would be considered critical. 
 
This stage gives an overview of the assets features in the control and process safety system to 
enhance and visualize the way we identify the source of hazards and threats as soon as the 
assets are identified. 
 
The Critically classification process is the analysis that evaluate the assets based on two 
criteria:  
 
• Vulnerability scan to cyber-attack 
This process is to classify the security weaknesses in all assets to check if hold a feature that 
is obviously vulnerable to cyber-attack. This scan performed to the following:  
 
o Assets in each level in SCADA system.  
o Physical, logical, human assets. 
 
A security engineer can check this asset based on his/her knowledge about the system. In 
addition, to the available tools, references, and databases for obtaining information about 
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assets vulnerabilities, but in this step, we consider the asset is critical if there is a dependency 
to a vulnerable asset. 
 
The Scada system is vulnerable due to a variety of factors and causes, including but not 
limited to complex and insecure design There are issues with humans, elements/automation, 
and configuration (Weed, 2017). 
 
• Check the asset function (process or safety) 
In this stage we check the function of the assets and the interdependency with vulnerable 
assets. And the evaluation of assets covers the following attributes:  
 
o Perform process and safety functions.  
o Influences or dependence on the asset in step 1 including direct and indirect 
dependencies.  
  
• List all critical assets.  
 
5.4.1 Application of stage 3 on simplified SCADA system. 
 
In this simplified system, PLC is the main asset that can be considered vulnerable to cyber-
attack bases on the results of stage 2:  
1. PLC performs the functions remotely via wireless connection and no authentication 
and encryption in communication protocols. 
2. No authentication and encryption in its design. 
3. PLC can be access via HMI.  
 
We repeat this scan to the connected assets to PLC, which are actuator, because of the scan 
the actuator as device is not vulnerable to cyber but it is connected to a vulnerable asset. 
In this case we check the function of the actuator, The actuator influences the connected asset, 
the valve that perform a safety process and we conclude and list the relation between the 
vulnerable assets and the assets that influence or perform safety function. 
 
As a result of this analysis, we consider PLC as critical asset, due to the vulnerability to 
cyber-attack and indirectly connected to a safety valve that perform a safety function.  
 
 
5.5 Stage 4: Integrated risk analysis 
 
Integrated risk analysis is a systematic analysis that aims to assess undesirable risk scenarios 
from a safety and security perspective that could result in catastrophic events. 
 
• Identify relevant sources of risk (threats, hazards) and perform an uncertainty analysis of 
these sources. 
 
In process hazards, the cause of hazard is more predictable because individual control of loops 
is considered. The overall common mode of failure of the entire controller fails equally at all 
outputs. On the other hand, cyber hazards consider the entire control process, which consists 
of multiple loops simultaneously (ISA-TR84.00.09, 2017).Cyber and physical processes CPS 
such as SCADA  in CPSs are intertwined and interact through feedback control loops (for 
example, embedded cyber controllers monitor and control the system's physical variables, 
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while physical processes affect the monitoring system and computation units via wired or 
wireless networks  (Zio, 2018).  
 
Several methods and approaches can be used to identify sources of threat and hazards, such as 
former knowledge with similar system architecture and analysis, statistics, historical data, 
brainstorming exercises, and particular techniques such as failure mode and effect analysis,	
hazards and operability studies HAZOP(Aven, 2015). 
 
Many different types of threats can be posed to an ICS and classified into four categories: 
adversarial, accidental, structural, and environmental(Stouffer et al., 2015). 
 
• Identify the undesirable events and causal roots and attack path  
The purpose of this step is to figure out how the initiating event might take place and what 
conditions must be met in order to occur. In addition to the coordination of the attack with 
regards to the logical location of the asset in the SCADA Purdue model. 
It is possible to perform this step using event trees to identify the potential consequences of 
the initiating events(Aven, 2006).  
 
According to Aven (2006) mentioned the following tasks to perform an analysis to the risk 
sources for their level of uncertainty:  
1. obtaining information.  
2. identifying scenarios.  
3. assessing uncertainty.  
4. assigning probabilities. 
 
Threats must be characterized in sufficient depth to assist in the assessment of vulnerability 
and risk. The following are essential features to consider Type, motivation, triggers, capability 
methods, and trends(Moteff, 2005). 
 
There are a variety of possible attack scenarios and major risks related to integrated 
operations according to the Sintef report Jaatun et al.(2007), these are the common suggested 
risk scenario for ICS SCADA system: 
 
• Scenario 1: Virus infection influencing ICT and SCADA systems. 
One of the most common causes of virus infections offshore is when the supplier's computer 
is connected to the production network, and the virus is distributed from a supplier to an 
operator. This incident can happen for several reasons, such as the supplier and the operator 
have different patching systems and security measures, lack of effective updating systems, or 
no barriers and safeguards. An infected computer connected to the process control component 
was discovered after a week of being in the booting process. This virus can lead to different 
consequences, including possible disruption of safety instrumented systems resulting in safety 
incidents or accidents and reduced production and profit. 
 
• Scenario 2: Denial of service incident influencing the SCADA systems 
The Denial of Service (DoS) attacks are a significant threat to the ICS. It is the goal of attack 
to prevent a system from accessing authorized resources or from using those resources in the 
manner intended(Ylmaz et al., 2018) . A denial-of-service (DoS) attack targets a component 
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of information technology at an offshore production facility. This attack flooding the target 
with traffic that increases the traffic load of the system that leads to production shutdown, loss 
of communication, and the possible impact on SIS.; the reason for DOS attack can be a 
malfunction or a malicious attack on a component that continually sends out error packets. 
 
• Scenario 3: Insider threat 
An insider threat comes from a dissatisfied employee who builds a backdoor in the production 
environment, creating a critical situation or allowing a shutdown during production. A 
disgruntled employee causes that because he got fired due to the reductions in the workforce. 
As a result of this decision, he wants to get revenge on his company by accessing the offshore 
production network and implementing a backdoor that may never be discovered except if the 
attacks launched and cause visible consequences. The consequences of an insider can destroy, 
manipulate, or edit data that are resulting in reduced or stopped production, business 
disruption, difficulties with safety instrumented systems, loss of communication between on- 
and offshore control rooms. 
 
• Scenario 4: Missing situational awareness. 
The service provider representative was shutting down a valve in production on an offshore 
oil and gas facility. The service provider deemed he shut down a valve in the test 
environment.  Fortunately, the central control room operator discovered what occurred and 
managed to open the valve, thus detecting, and avoiding a critical situation. This condition has 
happened as a result of a lack of situational awareness among actors. 
To analyze uncertainty due a cyber-attack scenario, a threat analysis is performed based on 
the asset identification and classification steps results on the assets that could be used as an 
adversary entry point into the system to investigate potential attack paths and attack scenarios 
result from interdependencies. 
  
An adversary's behavior can be emulated using adversary emulation plans (AEPs) as shown in 
the figure, which are defined by a specific set of tactical tactics and procedures (TTPs) in 
MITRE ATT&CK. 
 
To illustrate how advanced persistent threat compromises a system and exfiltrates sensitive 
information. AEPs are used by security teams to develop attack simulations based on specific 












• Perform a consequence analysis, with associated uncertainties. 
 
In the integrated risk assessment of SCADA systems, various undesirable scenarios and their 
potential consequences are analyzed and associated uncertainties. With particular attention to 
interactions among the two sectors, safety, and security. Event tree is one of the methods that 
relevant for performing consequences analysis(Aven, 2006).  
 
Another method to analyze the possible consequences is a vulnerability analysis with 
particular attention paid to the system's weakness) of potential threats and hazards(Aven & 
Renn, 2010). 
 
According to Stouffer et al. (2015), deep analysis and understanding of the source of 
vulnerabilities can reveal specific underlying causes and observations and help identify 
optimum mitigation strategies, and suggested the following groups of vulnerabilities: 
 
1. Policy and Procedure. 
2. Architecture and Design. 
3. Configuration and Maintenance. 
4.  Physical. 
5. Software Development. 
6. Communication and Network.  
 
• Strength of knowledge assessment  
 
In this stage we should always present the strength of knowledge judgments alongside hybrid 
classification and uncertainties analysis in a security and safety environments.  
Askeland et al.(2017) suggested a set of qualitative criteria for evaluating the strength 
knowledge of a security risk assessment in the Table 8: 
 
Table 8 Evaluation of the strength knowledge of a security risk assessment (Askeland et al., 2017) 
SoK 
label 










1. The phenomena involved are considered well understood: 
a. All risk sources (actors) are known. 
b. Both the capacity and the intention of the risk sources are considered well understood. 
c. Both models used to reflect and predict risk source (actor) knowledge and behavior (including 
knowledge of and response to measures) and models used to predict consequences, are known to 
give predictions with the required accuracy. 
2. Much reliable data is available: 
a. High-frequency events: Both common-cause variation and special-cause variation are well 
characterized 
b. Rare events: Knowledge component data not relevant 
3. There is broad agreement among experts 
4. All assumptions have been identified, documented, and are seen as very reasonable: 
a. All explicit assumptions are documented 
b. A process for identifying tacit assumptions has been carried out 
c. All explicit assumptions are seen as highly reasonable, and the effect of potential further tacit 
assumptions is considered negligible 





Conditions between strong and weak 
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• Risk description  
 
The multidisciplinary experts can identify, and list of hazards/cyber threats and undesirable 
events related SCADA system. With consideration to the expected consequences that have a 
safety impact, these consequences can be categorized into minor, moderate and major. 
Probabilities as a measure of uncertainties are divided by categories as follows: low, medium, 
and high. Background knowledge is supported by expert judgements, and relevant prior threat and 
risk assessments. 
Risk can describe using the following elements: 
• Identify the hazards/ cyber threats and undesirable events A’ 
• Expected consequences C’ 
According to Stouffer et al (2015) there are certain factors that must be considered: 
consequences for dependent systems and processes/ Physical environment/ safety, and the 
effect on the physical systems and processes. 
• Measure of uncertainty P 
• Background knowledge K 
• Risk level according to the above information  
  
5.5.1 Application of stage 4 on simplified SCADA system. 
Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs) are assets in the SCADA system that supports 




1. The phenomena involved are not considered well-understood: 
a. No risk sources (actors) are known 
b. Both the capacity and the intention of the risk sources are considered poorly understood 
c. Both models used to reflect and predict risk source (actor) knowledge and behaviour (including 
knowledge of and response to measures), and models used to predict consequences, are non-existent 
or known to give poor predictions 
2. Data are not available, or are unreliable: 
a. High-frequency events: Both common-cause variation and special-cause variation are poorly 
characterized 
b. Rare events: Knowledge component data not relevant 
3. There is considerable disagreement among experts 
4. Assumptions have not been identified and documented, or represent strong simplifications: 
a. Explicit assumptions have not been documented 
b. A process for identifying tacit assumptions has not been carried out 
c. Most explicit assumptions (if any) are seen as representing strong simplifications, and the effect of 
tacit assumptions is considered non-negligible 
5. The knowledge K has not been scrutinised 
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actuators to the pressure valve based on input from digital sensors. This affects physical 
processes; if the  
pressure inside the pipeline rises above a set point level, the excess pressure may cause an 
undesirable event. Figure 17 shows the analysis of the undesirable event. 
 
 




• Identify relevant sources of risk (threats, hazards) and perform an uncertainty analysis of 
these sources. 
 
A HAZOP study is a systematic examination of how deviations from a system's design 
requirements can occur, as well as an examination of the risks that these deviations may pose. 
Scenarios that could result in a hazard or an operational problem are recognized using a set of 
guidewords   (Aven, 2015).  
  
The relevant parameter for this process is Pressure and guideword used is more (increase 










Table 9  HAZOP analysis with integrated perspective 
 
 
Table 10 Risk level 
 
 
Some safeguards and countermeasures can affect the likelihood of occurring of an event, and 
others can affect the consequences of that event. 
• Identify the undesirable events and causal roots and attack path. 
In this simplified model, the identified scenarios are as follows: 
 
1. Valve failure  










Deviation Causes Cause 
Category 














• Fire/ explosion 
Overpressure and 
damage to pipeline 

















Cyber threat • Fire/ explosion 
• Sabotage operation  
• Pressure relief 
valve 






















Probability  Risk level 
 
Major Likely High  Moderate Likely High 
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The question we mays aske in this step is what conditions must be met in order for 
overpressure to occur? Event tree analysis can be used to answer this question. 
As show in the Figure 17, the top event is overpressure in the pressure pipeline, this event 




Figure 18 Fault Tree Analysis for Overpressure in the Pressure pipeline 
 
 
• Perform a consequence analysis, with associated uncertainties. 
 
In the integrated risk assessment of SCADA systems, critical assets are analyzed in 
consideration of the consequences and associated uncertainties. Paying particular attention to 
interactions among the two sectors. It is necessary to conduct a consequence analysis for the 
initiating events of a cyber-attack to understand the consequences of the overpressure as 
shown in the Figure 19. This analysis can provide a new countermeasure that can reduce the 
















Figure 19 Event tree analysis for FDIA attack 
The vulnerabilities of ICS and the architecture of the infrastructure are affecting the whole 
system. A variety of attack methods are available to exploit these vulnerabilities, with the 
false data injection attack being one of the most damaging. This is due to the fact that attacks 
allow for the controlled modification of data as well as the modification of firmware codes 
(Gönen et al., 2020). 
 
• Strength of knowledge assessment  
 
Understanding relevant phenomena: Are the risk sources /cyber threats outlined in the 
discussion typical of what we might encounter? 
 
Understanding the assumptions: To what extent do the SCADA architecture and other assets 
characterize the design and operations of the system.   
 
Reliable data availability: What is the quality level of the data and other documents? Are there 
any other attacks with similar consequences that we may investigate and compare the system 
to? Is the data quality sufficient to allocate specific security and safety requirements?  
  
Consensus level between experts: Is there a consensus among the multidisciplinary (safety 
and security) team after all the discussions? Are we convinced that the risk has been 
adequately understood and controlled based on our conversations thus far? 
 
Understanding the assumptions: To what extent does the SCADA architecture, and other 


















• Risk Description. 
 
Table 11 presents the risk discerption according to R (A`, C`, Q, K)  
 





























Hazard/ threat  Consequences  
 
Probabilities SoK Risk level 



















































6 Discussions  
 
In this chapter, we will look at some of the issues that came up as a result of the scientific 
literature review and industry standards, including determining the similarities and differences 
in terms of safety and security. A summarize of relevant standards were discussed.  
The proposed framework's strengths and limitations and the suggested future work are also 
highlighted. 
 
6.1 Safety vs security in the proposed framework 
 
One of the main questions that need to be addressed is the distinctions between safety and 
security in terms of concepts, risk viewpoints, and lifecycle? To understand how to integrate 
safety and security risk analysis into one framework, we must first know the similarities and 
differences between the two domains and where they intersect. 
 
The terms safety and security are frequently interchanged. Although these are two distinct 
concepts, they are linked; as we mentioned earlier in chapter 2, safety is generally defined as 
preventing accidents. On the other hand, security has defined a defense against malicious 
intentions. In both definitions, they limited the safety to unintentional events and the security 
to intentional. Security events can occur accidentally, such as an insider that accidentally 
releases sensitive information without any intention; according to the IEC62443 intentional 
and unintentional events might be classified as cybersecurity events. In this case, both safety 
and security undesirable events can occur accidentally. 
 
We have reviewed the safety and security concept in terms of risk in chapter 2 and agreed 
both safety and security can be viewed as being without unacceptable risk which is sharing 
the same purpose to keep people safe from harm. Refereeing to the simplified SCADA system 
in chapter 5, there are two scenarios related to an overpressure pipeline that should be 
protected in the simplified SCADA model. In the first scenario, the pipeline is protected due 
to a valve failure, which is most likely an accident related to the safety to protect the pipeline 
by implementing safety measures. In the second scenario, the pipeline is protected due to a 
cyber-attack or, most likely, a malicious intention related to the security to protect the pipeline 
by implementing safety or security measures. The goal in both scenarios is to avoid 

















6.2 ICS relevant standards  
 
There are limitations with IT standards when applying them in the ICS system due to the 
significant differences and security requirements, as presented in Table 3  IT vs. ICS.  
The major risk impact in the IT system is a delay in business operations; on the other hand, 
loss of life is the major risk impact in the ICS system. 
 
Data confidentiality and integrity are the top priority of IT security, whereas availability is the 
top priority of ICS security, as previously stated. 
Nevertheless, the safety aspect must be considered a priority inside the ICS security as 
controlling the physical world, and ensuring human safety comes first, followed by 
safeguarding the process, leading that IT security tried is inadequate for the ICs system. 
 
 
ISO 31000(2018) is a general risk management standard that does not specifically address 
safety and security. IEC 61511(2016) is a performance-based standard that focuses on safety-
critical systems in the process sector based on the safety lifecycle and clearly states the 
necessity to carry out the security risk assessment. 
 
The NIST SP 800-82 (2015) and IEC 62433(2009) are the most comprehensive 
recommendations for security owners and vendors on protecting industrial control systems; 
moreover, they are examples of the current security standards for the industrial control 
system. Although a range of safety and security related standards were presented in chapter 3, 
neither standard, guidelines, and best practices encompass all aspects of safety and 
cybersecurity for ICS systems as listed in Table 12. The lack of a systematic approach is 
mainly what motivated us to propose an integrated framework.  
 
Typically, the framework chosen will be determined by the industry and regulatory drivers 
that may necessitate a particular standard.  
 
 
Table 12 Summarize the domain of relevant standards 
Name Domain  System  
ISO 31000 
 
General  General  
IEC61511 Safety/ Partly security  SIS 
NIST SP 800-82 Security  ICS  
IEC 62433 Security  ICS  
DNVGL- RP-l08 
 
Security  ICS  




6.3 The integrated risk identification in the proposed framework  
 
 
In relation to the simplified SCADA system described in Chapter 5, PLC features and 
attributes are presented based on the findings of the asset analysis and hybrid classifications, 
which provides a proper understanding of the system´s shortcomings before moving forward 
with the suggested design. The results from this stage show the relationship between PLC, 
sensors, and other assets. 
This analysis can be particularly beneficial when doing an integrated risk analysis because it 
gives insight into discovering hidden hazards and cyber threats beneath the assets features 
with possible consequences. 
 
Integrated risk identification could assist in determining what safeguards and countermeasures 
would be required to reduce the risks of a cyberattack. To enable the process safety analysis to 
visualize the possible threats and hazards and prioritize assets that need to implement the 
required countermeasures. In case of significant cyber threats, we may be protected by using 
safeguards that are not vulnerable to cyber-attacks. 
 
In the HAZOP analysis, we consider an overpressure in a pipeline, as illustrated in section 
5.5.1. Regularly a process hazard analysis was performed to identify the undesired scenarios 
that may occur and prevent this from occurring by adding safety measures; in order to 
guarantee that security requirements in the functional safety life cycle criteria are satisfied, we 
need to consider in this analysis if a cyberattack produces undesirable scenarios events. 
 
Moreover, based on the HAZOP analysis findings, what the attacker can do if managed to get 
access to the control center or PLC, the adversary can manipulate the sensors readings and 
cause catastrophic events. A successful attack in the control center will impact the safety and 
protection systems to an unacceptable level. 
 
The suggested integrated framework views at risk from the consequences side and associated 
uncertainties; from that side, we can reduce the risk effectively, first by identifying the 
undesirable scenarios despite the causes and identifying either a cyber or physical threat 
causing those. What are the safety measures or countermeasures to prevent cyber events from 
causing these catastrophic events? 
 
In the HAZOP analysis, we Suggest separating process safety safeguards and cybersecurity 
countermeasures to show that they may compensate each other and present the possible gaps. 
For example, in the second scenario we had there, cyber threats may cause pressure increases, 
but the eventual consequence may be mitigated with process safety safeguards, i.e., pressure 
relief valve in this case. A pressure relief valve is highly effective at preventing a high 









6.4 Strengths and limitations of the framework 
 
An integrated risk analysis founded on a robust framework, incorporated with experts' 
experiences from the safety and security domain, is highly beneficial to organizations that 
adequately raise their maturity level, efficiency, and cost effectiveness. This framework is 
built on the finding of the scientific literature and the risk theory. One of the main strengths of 
this framework is built on risk management standard ISO 31000 (2018), which are applicable 
in different types of risk (safety or security), and the scientific article "a unified framework for 
risk and vulnerability analysis covering both safety and security" Aven (2006) that 
highlighted the uncertainties associated with risk. 
 
Moreover, justify why we can use safety and security from one risk perspective; strength of 
knowledge assessment is applied in this framework which can present the knowledge level 
about the phoneme to introduce it in the risk picture.  
 
Assets analysis and hybrid classifications are other vital stages in the framework; this stage 
can present the relationship between assets, which can be an input to integrated risk analysis, 
discover hidden influencing factors, and visualize the complexity and interdependencies of 
the SCADA system. The proposed framework can help organizations make better decisions 
about appropriate safeguards and control measures. 
 
 
Aside from the advantages that this framework offers, it also has certain limitations: 
 
• This framework has not been tested and validated in full implementation of real SCADA 
system.  
• The stage of analyzing assets is restricted to apparent features and attributes, which may 
be enhanced by examining these assets using a comprehensive analysis of various 
features.  
• The hybrid classification has limits on understanding the interaction between cyber-
attack-vulnerable assets and assets that perform a safety function. 
• The vulnerability scan is mainly dependent on the analyst's experience, which may lead to 
inaccurate results. 
• The thesis only investigated limited cybersecurity and safety risk standards and did not 
include any relevant regulations. 
 
6.5  Future work  
 
Further research is needed to validate and evaluate the scalability of the proposed integrated 
framework in a real SCADA system, plus examine the framework to other existing ICS 
systems. 
Future studies might consider other standards and regulations. It is crucial to assess all current 
standard, frameworks, and regulations to detect and address any flaws. Asset analysis is 
provided and included in stage 2; this classification may be broadened to include other 





7 Conclusion  
 
The main objective of this thesis was to develop an integrated risk analysis for the SCADA 
system with safety and security perspectives; due to the lack of systematic standards and 
framework that cover security risk with safety consequences in the ICS system. 
Safety and security can be integrated by understanding the distinction between them in terms 
of concept, risk perspective, and lifecycle since both domains sharing the same goal of 
keeping people safe. This was done by reviewing scientific risk theories, theoretical concepts, 
and industry standards to present where safety and security overlapped and differed. 
 
Various safety and security-related standards and recommendations are discussed, but none of 
them cover all aspects of safety and cybersecurity for ICS system. To determine which 
standards or framework to choose will be based on industry requirements and regulatory 
drivers that may necessitate a particular standard. Despite the fact that IEC 61511(2016) 
standard is mainly concerned with safety, and IEC 62433(2009) standard is primarily 
concerned with security, Integration between both of them are the most relevant standards 
when considering the subject of safety and cybersecurity. One of the challenges is that the 
IEC 62433 is comprehensive, making it difficult to execute. Another challenge is the 
integration of experts from different disciplines, since each team has its own way and method 
of analyzing risk and handling the system, which might be difficult to achieve one common 
language. 
 
Assess, implement, and maintain phase are the key elements of the functional safety and 
cybersecurity lifecycle, and because of these similarities, engineers, operations technology, 
and information technology teams can combine the two lifecycles to create a single integrated 
lifecycle that can improve awareness of all potential hazards, threats, mitigation measures, 
and response plans. 
 
This thesis proposed an integrated risk analysis framework that is mainly based on risk 
management standards ISO 31000 (2018), and a scientific article “a unified framework for 
risk and vulnerability analysis covering both safety and security” Aven(2006), to provide a 
holistic framework from the safety and security perspective. This framework focuses on a 
comprehensive understanding of the scope of the SCADA system, assets analysis, and hybrid 
classification to analyze the complexity and dependency of different types of assets in a 
SCADA system. A process hazard analysis regarding cybersecurity was undertaken and 
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